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MEXICO'S CATCH-22: HOW THE 
NECESSARY EXTRADITION OF DRUG 
CARTEL LEADERS UNDERMINES LONG-
TERM CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS 
WALTER RODRIGUEZ* 
Abstract: Grisly cartel violence has plagued Mexico in recent decades, effective-
ly destabilizing its government and encasing its citizenry in trepidation and fear. 
A joint operation between Mexican Marines and the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration in February 2014, however, finally penetrated the myth of invul-
nerability for drug trafficking organizations with the arrest of that world’s most 
powerful leader, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán. Although this development is ev-
idence of Mexican law enforcement’s newfound ability to track and capture the 
most dominant of drug bosses, Mexico’s criminal justice system continues to 
lack the requisite structure, political will, and expertise to mount such a high-
profile prosecution successfully. Mexico, therefore, must extradite Guzmán to the 
United States to ensure that he receives immediate and adequate justice. A failed 
prosecution in Mexico would undermine public trust and subvert implementation 
of Mexico’s recent criminal justice reforms before they are realized, ultimately 
stunting its conversion to an accusatorial, public trial system and maintaining the 
violent status quo.  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the bodies of fourteen men and women were hung from meat 
hooks in the northeast Mexican border town of Nuevo Laredo.1 A note accom-
panying the victims was signed, “Attentively, Chapo. Remember I am your real 
daddy.”2 Such gruesome artistry is characteristic of the Mexican drug kingpin, 
Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, notorious leader of the Sinaloa Cartel.3 The Sina-
loa Cartel has been responsible for an estimated 25 percent of illegal drugs enter-
                                                                                                                           
 * Walter Rodriguez is an Executive Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
 1 Whitney Eulich, Why ‘El Chapo’ Capture Could Intensify Mexico’s Drug Wars, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/
2014/0224/Why-El-Chapo-capture-could-intensify-Mexico-s-drug-wars-video, archived at http://perma.
cc/ZZM5-5TF3. 
 2 Ioan Grillo, What the Arrest of ‘El Chapo’ Means for Mexico, TIME (Feb. 23, 2014), http://
time.com/9283/what-the-arrest-of-el-chapo-means-for-mexico/, archived at http://perma.cc/V2KC-
UCWB. 
 3 See id. 
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ing the United States through Mexico, with an approximated annual revenue 
exceeding three billion dollars.4 A 2001 escape from prison via a laundry truck 
fed into Guzmán’s larger than life persona, resulting in his title as Chicago’s 
Public Enemy No. 1 and his ranking in Forbes magazine as one of the “World’s 
Most Powerful People.”5 In some locales, Guzmán’s legend rivaled the likes of 
Pablo Escobar or Al Capone, where his Robin Hood persona was celebrated with 
rap and folk songs.6 Guzmán’s cruelty culminated in 2010, when Sinaloa Cartel 
members kidnapped thirty-six-year-old Hugo Hernandez from the Mexican state 
of Sonora.7 Authorities soon discovered his corpse chopped to pieces, with his 
arms, legs, and skull placed in separate boxes and his torso in a plastic contain-
er.8 In a grotesque public display of brutality, Sinaloa Cartel members skinned 
Hernandez’s face, stitched it to a soccer ball, and left a similar note reading, 
“Happy New Years, because this will be your last.”9 
Drug violence prompted former Mexican President Felipe Calderón to 
launch a “War on Drugs” in 2006.10 During his six years in office, Calderón in-
vested billions of dollars on training and equipment, attempted to reform the po-
lice and judicial systems, and sent more than 50,000 heavily armed, masked sol-
diers to patrol Mexican streets and battle the cartels.11 Homicides, however, 
whether barroom brawls or cartel feuds, increased steadily under Calderón from 
nearly nine thousand in 2007 to more than twenty-seven thousand in 2011.12 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Dolia Estevez, Should Mexican Drug Lord Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Be Extradited to 
the U.S.?, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2014/02/25/should-
mexican-drug-lord-joaquin-el-chapo-guzman-be-extradited-to-the-u-s/, archived at http://perma.cc/
7FP8-MZU7; Christopher Helman, Drug Lord ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán Captured in Mexico, FORBES 
(Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/02/22/billionaire-drug-lord-el-
chapo-guzman-captured-in-mexico/, archived at http://perma.cc/28RG-UMUJ. 
 5 See Helman, supra note 4. 
 6 See Estevez, supra note 4; Helman, supra note 4; Carrie Kahn, Ruthless Mexican Drug Traf-
ficker Was a Robin Hood in Home State, NPR (Feb. 24, 2014) http://www.npr.org/2014/02/24/
282123622/ruthless-mexican-drug-trafficker-was-a-robin-hood-in-home-state; William R. Long, Bil-
lionaire Drug Trafficker Rules: Powerful Medellín Cartel Safe in Its Colombia Base, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-02-21/news/mn-44055_1_gentle-green-mountains-
barrio-pablo-escobar-mayor-william-jaramillo, archived at http://perma.cc/97T9-2CER. 
 7 See Olga R. Rodriguez, Hugo Hernandez: Mexico Cartel Stiches Rival’s Face on Soccer Ball, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/09/mexico-cartel-stitches-
ri_n_417326.html, archived at http://perma.cc/82D6-KG74. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See Brianna Lee, Backgrounders: Mexico’s Drug War, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Jan. 2013, 
available at http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689 (last updated Mar. 5, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/R746-5TM6. 
 11 See Nick Miroff & William Booth, Mexico’s Drug War Is at a Stalemate as Calderón’s Presi-
dency Ends, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/
Calderón-finishes-his-six-year-drug-war-at-stalemate/2012/11/26/82c90a94-31eb-11e2-92f0-496af
208bf23_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/88VV-4B5R. 
 12 Id. 
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Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) also expanded their operations 
from simple drug trafficking to kidnapping, robbery, and extortion through the 
use of unprecedented acts of cruelty.13 
Recently, Guzmán’s reign of terror realized an appropriate end in Mazatlán, 
a Pacific port city in his home state of Sinaloa.14 Circumstances surrounding 
Guzmán’s arrest contradict his romanticized, untouchable aura of narco-
folklore.15 Mexican and American law enforcement tracked Guzmán through 
putrid black water, dead rats, and garbage as he journeyed from one safe house 
to another in a series of connecting tunnels and sewers.16 Such a muted end, with 
no “heroic” last stand, or even a single shot fired, has punctured the untouchable 
image of cartel leaders throughout the country.17 This has shifted perceptions of 
cartel power relative to the Mexican state.18 The Mexican government has now 
proven an ability to hunt down and overpower even the most powerful of ene-
mies using new methods of law enforcement.19 Given that federal prosecutors in 
various U.S. cities are vying to prosecute Guzmán, Mexico should extradite 
Guzmán to the United States immediately, so as to bring swift justice amounting 
to a victory for an evolving Mexican criminal justice system in dire need of pub-
lic trust and support.20  
While Mexico is overhauling its criminal justice system, it currently does 
not have the legal machinery in place to transform this iconic arrest into a sym-
bolic prosecution.21 A successful prosecution of Guzmán could parallel the para-
digmatic conviction of Al Capone in the United States, signifying both judicial 
ability and a downfall of DTOs in Mexico.22 Failure, however, in the form of a 
second escape from prison, prolonged detention, or an unsuccessful conviction, 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See id.; Criminal Cartels Drive Defense Expenditure in Mexico, ADS REPORTS (Aug. 19, 
2013), https://www.asdreports.com/news.asp?pr_id=1752, archived at https://perma.cc/C4JN-7PMA. 
 14 See Estevez, supra note 4. 
 15 Andrés Martinez, Don’t Extradite El Chapo: The Mexican Government Won’t Win Against the 
Cartels Unless It Can Prove It Can Lock Them Away, SLATE (Feb. 27, 2014) http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/02/el_chapo_shouldn_t_be_extradited_the_mexican_
government_must_prosecute_him.html, archived at http://perma.cc/63XE-BPQP. 
 16 See Estevez, supra note 4. 
 17 See Martinez, supra note 15. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See Editorial, Time to Extradite Mexico Drug Kingpin ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, DALL. NEWS (Feb. 
24, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20140224-editorial-time-to-extradite-mexicos-
guzman.ece, archived at http://perma.cc/4LP9-D22H. 
 21 See id.; James C. McKinley Jr., Mexico’s Congress Passes Overhaul of Justice Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/world/americas/07mexico.html, archived 
at https://perma.cc/43D3-UY5J?type=pdf. 
 22 See Helman, supra note 4; see Martinez, supra note 15. 
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would effectively condemn Mexico’s criminal justice overhaul to failure before 
it has a chance to take effect.23 
This Note argues that Mexico must extradite cartel leaders to the United 
States until it can prosecute such capos within its own borders. Part I of this 
Note provides background on the political condition of Mexico that has fostered 
the rise of such an engrained DTO influence within the country. This section 
further outlines the response to increasing violence by former President Felipe 
Calderón and the consequences of his militarized war on drugs. Part II details 
Mexico’s practice of extraditing its high-profile DTO kingpins, and its current 
mixed-inquisitorial criminal justice system, which has prevented successful 
prosecution of major cartel leaders. Part III argues that Mexico should continue 
to extradite cartel leaders like Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán until it can effective-
ly transition to a functioning, transparent criminal justice system through imple-
mentation of its 2008 criminal justice reforms. Part III further contends that it is 
in Mexico’s long-term interest to equip itself with these strategies to avoid fur-
ther flirtation with failed statehood and to permit a more significant and perva-
sive dismantling of DTO structures in the future.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Mexican Drug Cartels in Context 
1. The Mexican Political Dynamic 
Drug trafficking organizations have utilized Mexico’s entrenched political 
system to construct a systematic network of corruption that has ensured market 
access, distribution rights, and official government protection for decades.24 Alt-
hough Mexican gangs initially served as “mere couriers” for Colombian cartels, 
they eventually evolved into wholesalers of narcotics due, in part, to the success 
of efforts to dismantle Colombian narcotics organizations through operations 
such as “Plan Colombia.”25 The emergence of a multi-party political system in 
Colombia further decreased the power of its cartels due to newfound incentives 
to maintain political credibility and obtain political capital.26 Mexico, in contrast, 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Editorial, supra note 20; Helman, supra note 4; Martinez, supra note 15. 
 24 See Lee, supra note 10. 
 25 Id.; see Daniel Mejia, The War on Drugs Under Plan Colombia, in RETHINKING THE “WAR ON 
DRUGS” THROUGH THE US-MEXICO PRISM 19, 20 (Ernesto Zedillo & Haynie Wheeler eds., 2012), 
available at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/plan-colombia19-32.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/8HXR-399Y (defining “Plan Colombia” as a joint-effort between the United States and Colombia 
to dismantle Colombian drug trafficking organizations through interdiction, targeting of organization 
leaders, and eradication of production centers). 
 26 See Randall Collins, Drug Business Is Not the Key to Gangs and Organized Crime: With a 
Prognosis for the Mexican Cartel Wars, SOC. EYE (May 29, 2012), http://sociological-eye.blogspot.
com/2012/05/drug-business-is-not-key-to-gangs-and.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8UDQ-FRX
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has historically been ruled by only one party.27 The Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) ruled Mexico for seventy years prior to the election of 2000.28 PRI 
party members supplied numerous public-sector jobs to party backers and pro-
vided monopolies to private-sector allies in an effort to allay criticism and si-
lence opposition.29 PRI party members correspondingly maintained a “patron-
client relationship” with drug cartels.30 
The election of the National Action Party (PAN) candidate, Vicente Fox, in 
2000 marked an abrupt end to the established single party system of the PRI.31 
Newfound confidence in the more democratic, multi-party system forced the 
PRI to re-evaluate and reinvent itself to stay competitive with the PAN and to 
appeal to a more politically engaged citizenry.32 Immediately after his victory, 
Fox established the structural framework for Felipe Calderón’s eventual war on 
drugs when the Sinaloa and Juárez cartels first clashed publicly in a series of 
familial killings in Sinaloa and Mexico City in 2004.33 
2. United States Involvement: The Mérida Initiative 
The counter-narcotics initiative in Colombia, Plan Colombia, was con-
structed along a drug war model of enforcement and interdiction through the use 
of military forces and close U.S. participation.34 The initial name for the Mérida 
Initiative, “Plan Mexico,” was changed to the “Mérida Initiative” after it was 
determined that the moniker elicited too direct a comparison to the Plan Colom-
bia model, which riled Mexican nationalistic sentiment at the very thought of a 
U.S. military incursion into its sovereignty.35 The objective of this three-year 
$1.4 billion U.S. assistance package, agreed to in 2007, was to “maximize the 
                                                                                                                           
8?type=source; Natalia Cote-Munoz, Mexico’s Drug War: Not Another Colombia, COUNCIL ON HEM-
ISPHERIC AFF. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.coha.org/mexicos-drug-war-not-another-colombia/, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/Z3KE-BN7L?type=source. 
 27 See Mexico Election Sees Old Guard PRI Reclaim Power with Enrique Pena Nieto at Helm, CBS 
NEWS (July 2, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mexico-election-sees-old-guard-pri-reclaim-power-
with-enrique-pena-nieto-at-helm/, archived at http://perma.cc/AS9V-CJ7K [hereinafter Old Guard]. 
 28 See id. 
 29 Andrea Nill Sanchez, Mexico’s Drug “War”: Drawing a Line Between Rhetoric and Reality, 
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 470, 470–71 (2013). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id.; Opposition Wins Mexican Elections, ABC NEWS (July 3, 2000), http://www.abcnews.go.
com/international/story?id=83273, archived at https://perma.cc/ZN5K-P4A3?type=pdf [hereinafter Op-
position Wins]. 
 32 See Old Guard, supra note 27; Opposition Wins, supra note 31. 
 33 See Michel Marizco, Mexican President Calderón Leaves Office Under Wave of Criticism, 
FRONTERAS (Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/mexican-president-calderón-
leaves-office-under-wave-criticism, archived at https://perma.cc/5YQD-GUXK?type=pdf. 
 34 See Mejia, supra note 25. 
 35 See Laura Carlsen, A Plan Colombia for Mexico, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://fpif.org/a_plan_colombia_for_mexico/, archived at http://perma.cc/6UJN-DPLB. 
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effectiveness of efforts to fight criminal organizations.”36 This goal detailed four 
pillars, including “(1) [d]isrupting the operational capacity of organized criminal 
groups, (2) [i]nstitutionalizing reforms  to sustain the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, (3) [c]reating a 21st century border, [and] (4) [b]uilding strong and 
resilient communities.”37 Interagency disagreements, however, slowed imple-
mentation and delivery of actual aid to Mexico.38 According to a report by the 
Government Accountability Office, only 46 percent of the $1.32 billion prom-
ised to Mérida programs in Mexico had been obligated and a mere 9 percent had 
been expended as of 2010.39 Deliveries of equipment, training, and technical 
assistance accelerated in 2011, and a total of $1.1 billion worth of assistance had 
been provided as of November 2012.40 By May 2013, approximately 19,000 law 
enforcement personnel and 8,500 federal and 22,500 state justice workers had 
either completed U.S. training programs or received instruction on their new 
responsibilities within the emerging accusatorial system.41 
3. Calderón’s War on Drugs 
In six years, Calderón sent more than fifty thousand soldiers to safeguard 
Mexican streets and battle the cartels.42 By the end of his term, the war had 
claimed upwards of sixty thousand lives, including 532 soldiers and 3,500 police 
officers.43 Civilians, from mayors and lawyers to journalists and oil workers, 
were not immune and were often targeted.44 This extreme violence was both 
psychologically and emotionally grueling for the average citizen, causing a cul-
ture of fear to settle over the Mexican population.45 
Such unmitigated violence led then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an 
address the Council on Foreign Relations to state that traffickers “in some cases, 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Sanchez, supra note 29, at 472. 
 37 See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41349, U.S.-
MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND 6 (2013), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ZAC8-9YEE. 
 38 See Assessing the Mérida Initiative: A Report from the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the Comm. on Foreign Aff. 111th 
Cong. 10 (2010) (statement of Mr. Jess T. Ford, Dir., Int’l Aff. & Trade Team). 
 39 Id. at 25. 
 40 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 37, at 8. 
 41 Id. at 9. 
 42 See Ioan Grillo, Mexico: Calderón’s Legacy of Blood and Busts, GLOBAL POST, (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/121129/mexican-president-felipe-
calderon-drug-war-legacy, archived at https://perma.cc/3YW2-2SLR?type=source. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Daniel Hernandez, Calderón’s War on Drug Cartels: A Legacy of Blood and Tragedy, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec.1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/01/world/la-fg-wn-mexico-calderon-cartels-
20121130, archived at https://perma.cc/593Q-2JBE?type=source. 
 45 See id. 
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[were] morphing into or making common cause with what we would consider an 
insurgency in Mexico,” with insurgent groups controlling some 40 percent of the 
country.46 These remarks have prompted many academics and government offi-
cials to consider redefining the Mexican drug trafficking issue as a “non-
international armed conflict” by characterizing DTOs as Foreign Terrorist Or-
ganizations (FTOs), which would subject cartel members to laws controlling 
“non-international armed conflicts” (NIACs).47 
An NIAC designation would permit the Mexican government to label cartel 
members as unlawful enemy combatants and hold them in more secure military 
quarters for the duration of the conflict or until the Mexican government deter-
mines that the cartels cease to be a threat.48 DTOs characterized as unlawful en-
emy combatants would not be afforded the Geneva Convention protections.49 
Rather than designating cartels as FTOs, Calderón instead utilized a “kingpin 
strategy” of targeting DTO bosses as conventional criminals, which proved in-
strumental in arresting many powerful leaders.50 These leaders have either been 
extradited to the United States or held for years without a trial in Mexico.51 
4. Traditional Use of Extradition 
Extradition has traditionally been utilized in both Colombia and Mexico as 
a means of removing drug traffickers to the United States to stand trial on Amer-
ican soil.52 To traffickers, imprisonment in the United States has meant losing 
touch with their families and their ability to direct their criminal organizations.53 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Clinton Says Mexico Drug Crime Like an Insurgency, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11234058, archived at https://perma.cc/PX7A-CVJV?type=
source. 
 47 See Major Nagesh Chelluri, A New War on America’s Old Frontier: Mexico’s Drug Cartel 
Insurgency, 210 MIL. L. REV. 51, 58 (2011) (asserting that Mexico is engaged in a non-international 
armed conflict); Sanchez, supra note 29, at 476–77. 
 48 See Chelluri, supra note 47, at 86–90, 94–95. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Miroff & Booth, supra note 11; Havana Pura, Kingpin Strategy, BORDERLAND BEAT (Oct. 
28, 2012), http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/10/kingpin-strategy.html archived at http://perma.cc/
PE3T-B6ZT. A “kingpin strategy” is a DEA methodology of targeting the command-and-control ele-
ments of DTOs. Pura, supra note 50. 
 51 See Miroff & Booth, supra note 11. 
 52 See Melanie M. Reid, Mexico’s Crisis: When There’s a Will, There’s a Way, 37 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 397, 408–09 (2012); Mimi Yagoub, Mexico Unlikely to Grant U.S. Extradition Request for El 
Chapo, INSIGHT CRIME (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/will-mexico-grant-
the-us-extradition-request-for-el-chapo, archived at https://perma.cc/6ZUV-UF5P?type=source. 
 53 Geoffrey Ramsey, Colombia Reassesses Policy of Drug Traffickers to US, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/
0409/Colombia-to-reassess-policy-of-extraditing-drug-traffickers-to-US, archived at https://perma.cc/
52KT-QD4Z?type=source. 
166 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 38:159 
The United States and Colombia approved a bilateral extradition treaty in 
1979.54 The prospect of extradition quickly became the greatest fear of Colom-
bian cartel leaders and of Pablo Escobar, in particular.55 As a result, the Medellín 
Cartel waged a campaign of fear against the Colombian government and the citi-
zenry.56 Colombia extradited its first four drug traffickers to Miami in 1985.57 
Days after the extradition, the United States became aware of a Medellín cartel 
hit list that included embassy members and their families, U.S. journalists, and 
businessmen.58 Later that year, the Medellín Cartel attacked the Colombian Pal-
ace of Justice, where at least ninety-five people were killed, including eleven 
Supreme Court Justices in a twenty-six hour siege that destroyed all pending 
extradition requests by fire.59 In response to multiple threats from traffickers, the 
Colombian Supreme Court annulled the extradition treaty with the United States 
in May of 1987.60 In 1989, after presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán spoke 
in favor of extradition, he was assassinated in Bogotá.61 In response, then-
President Virigilio Barco Vargas issued an emergency decree re-establishing the 
policy of extradition.62 A subset of the Medellín Cartel called “the Extraditables” 
subsequently declared a bombing and murder campaign against the Colombian 
government that would last for two years.63 In a secret vote, the Colombian as-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/, archived at https://perma.cc/742X-TGKV?type=source [here-
inafter Thirty Years]. 
 55 See Karl Penhaul, 2nd Drug Suspect Extradited: Colombia Gives U.S. a Reputed Associate of 
Cali Kingpins, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-
11/26/061r-112699-idx.html, archived at https://perma.cc/Z7LR-TJHE?type=source; Thirty Years, 
supra note 54. Pablo Escobar waged a bloody campaign in response to the prospect of extradition of 
Colombian citizens to the United States. See Penhaul, supra note 55; infra note 54–62 and accompa-
nying text. 
 56 See Penhaul, supra note 55. 
 57 Thirty Years, supra note 54. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Kevin Noblet, Drug Lords Start ‘War’ in Colombia, PHILLY.COM (Aug. 25, 1989), http://
articles.philly.com/1989-08-25/news/26148906_1_finance-minister-edgard-gutierrez-drug-lords-bomb-
attacks, archived at https://perma.cc/64QU-FB63?type=source. In their communiqué, The Extraditables 
state: 
We declare total and absolute war on the government, on the industrial and political ol-
igarchy, on the journalists that have attacked and ravaged us, on the judges that have 
sold out to the government, on the extraditing magistrates, on the presidents of the un-
ions and all those who persecuted and attacked us . . . .We won’t respect the families of 
those who have not respected our families . . . .We will burn and destroy the industries, 
the properties and the mansions of the oligarchies. 
Id. 
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sembly banned extradition in a new constitution.64 Colombia reinstituted extradi-
tion in 1995.65 President Álvaro Uribe extradited more than 1,100 Colombians to 
the United States during his two terms in office.66  
Extradition from Mexico to the United States remains uneven and unpre-
dictable.67 Under Calderón, extraditions reached historic levels with 115 sus-
pects being sent to the United States in 2012.68 Extraditions from Mexico de-
creased to a total of fifty-four in 2013.69 Eduardo Arellano-Félix, of the Arella-
no-Félix Organization, was extradited to the United States in 2010 and sentenced 
to fifteen years in a U.S. prison for conspiracy to launder money and to use and 
invest illicit drug profits.70 His two brothers, Benjamín and Francisco Javier, are 
also in U.S. prisons for racketeering, drug trafficking, and money laundering.71 
Tension surrounding extradition between the United States and Mexico in-
creased in August of 2013 as a result of a Mexican judge’s grant of early release 
to former Guadalajara Cartel leader Rafael Caro Quintero— the man thought to 
have directed the torture and murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) agent Enrique Camarena.72 
DISCUSSION 
A. Mexico’s Mixed Inquisitorial System 
Mexico’s constitution originally provided for provisions resembling an ac-
cusatory model, including the incorporation of jury trials and the presumption of 
innocence, but the legislature failed to pass the requisite implementing laws to 
effectuate these provisions at the federal level.73 As a result, Mexico continues to 
operate under a closed-door hybrid inquisitorial system lacking many of the pro-
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tections offered in other criminal justice systems.74 The inconsistency between 
Mexico’s constitutional principles and its criminal procedures continues to 
plague its criminal justice system as a result of this hybrid system.75 
The 1917 constitution empowered public prosecutors by investing in them 
complete authority for criminal proceedings.76 Public prosecutors were thus 
tasked with not only bringing criminal charges, but also overseeing both the in-
vestigatory police agencies and individual investigations.77 In making a decision, 
the judge would rely on a written report (a “dossier”) created by the public pros-
ecutor.78 Evidence pertaining to the accused, like most other aspects of a case, 
was sealed to the public until the end of the case.79 This unchecked power in-
cluded the ability to disregard exculpatory evidence at will, with little to no ex-
ternal accountability.80 Such a weakened judiciary made it difficult to question 
the quality of investigations in court, oftentimes eliminating the incentive to ad-
here to legality, and producing jurisprudential atrophy as a result.81 
Although prosecutors enjoyed such unchecked power in certain respects, 
they lacked one vital function: prosecutorial discretion.82 Mexico’s “principle of 
legality” required that, aside from rare exceptions, a prosecution would be car-
ried out in full, to its final conclusion, once it entered the “highway” of tradition-
al criminal procedure.83 Moreover, Mexican courts did not observe a presump-
tion of innocence in practice, despite its 1917 constitutional guarantee.84 This 
presumption of guilt is applied almost exclusively to the poor, whereas the am-
paro, Mexico’s habeas corpus equivalent, is often extended only to those who 
can afford it, such as narcotics traffickers, kidnappers, and other criminals.85 
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B. Mexico’s Constitutional Reforms 
On June 18, 2008, Mexico passed judicial reforms mandating a package of 
changes covering all thirty-two states and the federal justice system that would 
effectively transition the closed-door, mixed inquisitorial process based on writ-
ten arguments to an accusatorial, public trial system with oral advocacy by 
2016.86 The United States and Mexico view the implementation of these 2008 
reforms as vital to their bilateral efforts under the Mérida Initiative.87 Effectuat-
ing such judicial reforms has brought challenges, including the need to revise 
federal and state criminal procedure codes, to build new courtrooms, to retrain 
legal professionals, to update law school curricula, and to improve forensic 
technology.88 Limited prosecutorial aptitude in gathering the type of evidence 
required to build strong cases has kept conviction rates low.89 Survey data 
gathered from the Mexican public and relevant justice sector actors has pro-
vided insight as to the sentiment surrounding the reforms.90 For example, Mex-
ico’s failure to communicate the goals of the new system to its citizenry and 
prepare them for new concepts such as plea-bargaining has led to a public be-
lief that the new system is too “soft” on crime.91 
The difficulty has been the ability for those trained in the inquisitorial mod-
el to learn the new procedure quickly.92 Victims now also have the ability to 
challenge, before a judicial authority, any public prosecutor who decides not to 
prosecute, fails to present certain evidence, or drops a criminal proceeding.93 
This is important because of how few crimes are ever investigated or prosecuted; 
even though approximately 85–90 percent of crimes brought to trial result in 
conviction, less than 25 percent of crimes in Mexico are actually reported.94 The 
constitutional reforms also introduce a new system of rehabilitation with an em-
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phasis on juvenile offenders.95 Such an approach is especially significant for 
Mexico, because the youth serve as an interminable supply of recruits for 
DTOs.96 Mexican youth often have little education and fewer employment pro-
spects, and therefore, have no choice but to turn to DTOs.97 
Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies approved a new Código Nacional de Pro-
cedimentos Penales (National Penal Procedures Code) on February 5, 2014.98 
The new code establishes uniformity in the application of criminal laws across 
Mexico’s thirty-one states and Federal District.99 Prior to the passage of this 
new uniform criminal code, each state had its own procedures, which served as 
one of the largest impediments to implementation of the 2008 reforms.100 This 
new code standardizes procedures regarding investigations, arrests, charges, 
hearings, and sentencing.101 The professionalization of the investigative pro-
cess will set clearer guidelines for granting warrants, conducting home search-
es, and monitoring individual communications.102 Furthermore, all procedures 
will be either written down or audio- or video-recorded to ensure that the chain 
of custody is preserved and that trials are carried out in a fair and transparent 
manner. 103 
In 2012, the Technical Secretariat of the Interior Ministry, the body charged 
with overseeing the reform implementation, provided Mexican states with thirty-
four million dollars in subsidies to support their efforts and catalyze reforms, 
which stands in stark contrast to the lack of reform implementation at the federal 
level.104 The Mexican state of Chihuahua is the prototype for what the govern-
ment hopes will become the norm across the country.105 While only about twelve 
states, or roughly 36 percent, had begun operating under the new system as of 
December 2012, most of those states are on track to follow Chihuahua’s lead to 
reach implementation.106 
Shortcomings in the reforms, including reluctance to use plea-bargaining 
and unwillingness to cooperate across law agencies, have kept conviction rates 
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low.107 Furthermore, reports indicate that because there is no re-election in Mex-
ico at the state level, some governors refuse to invest in new court systems that 
will likely not be finished until they are out of office.108 Other elected officials 
have likewise delayed implementation due to concerns that it may hurt their 
popularity and make them appear too soft on crime.109 
The 2008 constitutional reforms also include specific measures aimed at 
combating organized crime.110 Mexican federal law defines organized crime as 
an organization of three or more individuals whose goal is the commission of 
crimes in a permanent or repeated way, “as provided by the law on the matter,” a 
reference to Mexico’s Ley Federal Contra La Delincuencia Organizada (Fed-
eral Statute Against Organized Crime)(LFCDO).111 These eleven requisite 
crimes include: terrorism, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, 
arms trafficking, trafficking of migrants, trafficking of organs, robbery, kid-
napping, trafficking of minors, and car theft.112 Authorities may also initially 
hold those suspected of organized crime for forty days without access to legal 
counsel, with the possibility of extending custody for another forty days.113 This 
practice, known as an arraigo, has reportedly led to abuse by authorities.114Ad-
ditionally, prosecutors of organized crime do not need to introduce evidence 
gathered from witnesses during the investigatory phase in front of the judge or 
defense attorney at trial.115 Despite these controversial practices, which in ef-
fect limit the rights of those affiliated with organized crime for easier prosecu-
tion, such groups have begun to diversify their activities to include kidnapping, 
bank robbery, extortion, and other criminal activities, while continuing to grow 
throughout the country.116 
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C. Legal Tools for Combatting Organized Crime 
1. The U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty 
Mexico and the United States signed an extradition treaty in 1978.117 Cur-
rently, the extradition of nationals is a discretionary matter for the Mexican gov-
ernment.118 The U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty provides that, if extradition is 
not granted on account of the nationality of the individual, the requested party 
shall submit the case to its competent authorities for its prosecution.119 Mexi-
co’s Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN) ruled in January of 2001 that the extra-
dition of Mexican nationals is in accord with Mexico’s constitution.120 The 
SCJN indicated that the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty grants a discretionary 
authority to the Mexican government upon request by the U.S. government to 
deliver Mexicans that committed offenses in the United States, if not prevented 
by Mexican laws.121 The SCJN ultimately concluded that Mexican federal law 
does not prohibit the extradition of Mexican nationals and that Mexican na-
tionals may be extradited pursuant to Article 9 of the Treaty.122 Furthermore, 
Mexico does not have the death penalty; therefore, Article 8 of the Treaty stip-
ulates that when an individual is requested for an offense that carries capital 
punishment, the requested party may refuse extradition unless the requesting 
party gives assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed.123 Moreover, 
Article 15 permits a requested party, after granting the extradition, to defer the 
individual’s surrender to a requesting state until the conclusion of the proceed-
ings or the imposition of punishment for a different offense within the request-
ed party’s own state.124 
Introduction of 21 U.S.C. § 959 in the United States allowed federal prose-
cutors to specifically target drug traffickers living and working in foreign coun-
tries.125 Many Title 21 drug statutes require that the offense take place within the 
trial district.126 Similarly, in drug conspiracy cases, venue is only proper in a dis-
trict where an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy was committed.127 This 
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requires the identification of an activity connected to the conspiracy in the dis-
trict where the defendant is to be charged.128 Now, under 21 U.S.C. § 959, the  
U.S. Attorney’s Office prosecuting the defendant no longer needs to worry about 
jurisdictional impediments, as long as it can be proven that a conspiracy to im-
port drugs into the United States existed.129 In recent years, however, this nexus 
with the United States element has been a source of frustration due to Mexico’s 
increasing trafficking efforts aimed toward European markets.130 Informants and 
recorded conversations now have to serve as the primary mode of proving a 
nexus by tying drug shipments seized in the United States to Mexican DTOs.131 
During the Calderón administration, Mexico extradited record numbers of crim-
inals to the United States.132 The extradition of cartel heads to the United States, 
while effective in the short term, has done little to strengthen Mexico’s own 
criminal justice system.133 
2. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act in the United 
States 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) has tradi-
tionally been one of the most potent governmental tools in combating organized 
crime.134 The U.S. Congress passed RICO in 1970 as an inventive means of tar-
geting a criminal organization as a whole, instead of pursuing liability only 
against its individual members.135 The statute strengthened law enforcement’s 
evidence-gathering apparatus, included harsher criminal punishments, and intro-
duced civil remedies, such as asset forfeiture, for those engaged in organized 
crime.136 
RICO is a complex and unique statute because of its incorporation of both a 
criminal offense and a civil cause of action.137 A RICO action necessitates proof 
that a defendant, “through the commission of two or more acts constituting a 
pattern of racketeering activity, directly or indirectly invested in, or maintained 
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an interest in, or participated in, an enterprise, the activities of which affected 
interstate or foreign commerce.”138 Prosecutors, therefore, have to prove each 
individual element, comprising of: “(1) the commission of two or more acts of 
‘racketeering activity,’ (2) a pattern, (3) an enterprise, (4) an effect on interstate 
commerce, and (5) that the accused act is prohibited.”139 The statute does not 
generate any new criminal offense, but simply heightens the punishments for 
members of a criminal organization who commit certain predicate crimes.140 
Compound liability punishes organized crime more severely because it is more 
likely to cause harm to society.141 Penalties include fines in proportion to the 
harm imposed, such as criminal forfeiture, and prison sentences of up to twenty 
years—sentences are significantly more severe than those levied for each indi-
vidual predicate offense.142 
RICO created several new legal concepts such as “racketeering activity,” 
“pattern” of racketeering activity, and “enterprise.”143 Conventional state crimes 
such as murder, kidnapping, and robbery, as well as an array of white-collar of-
fenses including financial institution fraud, money laundering, and immigration 
fraud all serve as “racketeering activity,” as listed under Section 1961(1) of RI-
CO.144 The Supreme Court stipulated that racketeering acts must be related to 
each other and demonstrate continuity to operate as a pattern.145 The statute fur-
ther states that “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not 
a legal entity” constitute an enterprise.146 
The concept of enterprise liability is particularly important to combat orga-
nized crime.147 In typical organized crime groups, there would be several diverse 
types of isolated agreements, but no commonly shared criminal objective.148 Due 
to this lack of a shared agreement, a group could be prosecuted only for several 
smaller schemes, as opposed to a larger overarching conspiracy.149 Common 
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models such as chain and wheel conspiracies are ineffective in taking down an 
entire criminal organization where it is difficult to infer a common objective be-
tween seemingly unrelated criminals.150 Thus, the introduction of enterprise lia-
bility allowed an agreement to participate in the affairs of a criminal enterprise 
by committing two predicate acts of racketeering activity to further the goals of 
the enterprise to form a basis for liability.151 
Mexico currently has in place what experts refer to as a pseudo-RICO stat-
ute.152 Mexico’s organized crime statute, the LFCDO, defines organized crime as 
three or more individuals organized permanently or repeatedly to try and commit 
one of the following eleven crimes: terrorism, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, 
money laundering, arms trafficking, trafficking of migrants, trafficking of or-
gans, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking of minors, and car theft.153 
3. Potential Classification of Drug Trafficking Organizations as Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations 
Many academics and government officials have considered redefining the 
Mexican drug trafficking issue as a “non-international armed conflict” (NIAC) 
by characterizing DTOs as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” thus subjecting 
them to the laws of armed conflict.154 The post-World War II Geneva Conven-
tions regulate armed conflicts between states in an effort to prevent unnecessary 
and unwarranted suffering.155 Common Article 3, so named because of its inclu-
sion in all four Geneva Convention treaties, provides minimum protections to 
combatants engaged in conflicts “not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”156 While Article 3 does not 
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provide concrete conditions necessary to determine what constitutes an NIAC, 
its drafting history and commentary detail several considerations that would 
permit an application of international law.157 Similarly, Additional Protocol II 
was created in 1977 to supplement protection for those suffering within NIACs, 
and applies to NIACs that “take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups.”158 Article 3 is often interpreted as demanding a higher level of violence 
before qualifying a conflict as an NIAC.159 This higher threshold, and its explicit 
exclusion of internal disturbances such as “acts of public disorder accompanied 
by acts of violence,” has led to the view that conditions need to reach a level of 
almost total civil war in order for the Protocol to apply.160 
The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY) further clarified definitional fissures regarding armed conflicts 
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left by the aforementioned international agreements.161 The ICTY, in Prosecutor 
v. Tadic, provided a broader definition of armed conflict than Additional Protocol 
II, concluding that an armed conflict exists whenever “there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental au-
thorities and organized armed groups within a State.”162 Other factors to consider 
include the intensity of the violence, the number of forces, and the types of forc-
es involved in the conflict.163 
The Additional Protocol II also provides three elements that should be con-
sidered to determine the classification of armed groups: (1) territorial control, (2) 
responsible military command capable of executing a sustained military cam-
paign, and (3) the ability to implement the Protocol.164 When read in conjunction 
with ICTY interpretations, additional considerations such as the ability to plan 
and execute troop movements and logistics, as well as the ability to speak with 
one voice and negotiate agreements, also become determining factors.165 Draft-
ing documents of Common Article 3 further indicate that for an NIAC to exist, 
parties would have “an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a 
State,” and indications of an intent to be bound by the Convention itself.166 
Historically, international law has arranged armed challenges to a state into 
three distinct stages, depending on their level of violence and intensity: rebel-
lions, insurgencies, and belligerencies.167 Rebellions form the lowest threat in 
the hierarchy, often characterized by localized and weak uprisings that the state 
can suppress with its local or national police force and its domestic laws.168 In-
surgencies, marked by an escalation in violence against the state’s authority, are 
adequately organized and provide a meaningful threat against the state’s legiti-
macy.169 Finally, the recognition of an insurgent group as a belligerent party enti-
tles both the insurgent group and the state to recognize the existence of an inter-
national armed conflict, thus triggering international laws and constraint.170 
U.S. Army Field manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes the goal of in-
surgencies is to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or 
ungoverned space that it controls.171 Moreover, insurgencies comprise of five 
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elements: (1) movement leaders, (2) combatants, (3) political cadre, (4) auxilia-
ries, and (5) a mass base.172 A characterization of Mexican DTO members as 
insurgents within an NIAC could necessitate a determination of their legal status 
as cartel fighters.173 Article 5 of the third Geneva Convention dictates that “such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present convention until such time as 
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”174 Such tribunals aid 
in determining who are lawful combatants deserving of Convention protections 
and who are offenders to be punished under the domestic laws of the capturing 
state.175 United States Army Regulation (AR) 190-8 provides rules and protec-
tions for those denied POW status in traditional international armed conflicts, 
stating that “a competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not 
appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a belliger-
ent act or has engaged in hostile activities.”176 An NIAC designation could per-
mit the Mexican government to label cartel members as unlawful enemy com-
batants and hold them in more secure military quarters for the duration of the 
conflict, or until the Mexican government determines that the cartels cease to be 
a threat.177 In Guantanamo Bay, for example, enemy fighters not belonging to a 
traditional state armed force are considered unlawful enemy combatants, are not 
afforded Geneva Convention protections, and may be placed before Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (CSRT), which parallel the United States Army Regula-
tion (AR) 190-8 tribunal for POWs.178 
The Mexican government recently incorporated armed civilian groups in-
to the fight against DTOs.179 The government reached an agreement with vigi-
lante leaders to integrate an estimated twenty thousand armed civilian group 
members into quasi-military units called the Rural Defense Corps.180 Mexican 
law enforcement and its military have unofficially allowed such groups to or-
ganize and act in the past, and in some cases, have even worked with these 
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vigilantes, many of whom are armed with assault rifles, weaponry civilians are 
not normally permitted to carry.181 Per the agreement, these units will be tem-
porary, under the control of the authority pursuant to provisions applicable, and 
will have to submit a list of their members to the Mexico’s Ministry of Nation-
al Defense.182 These provisions ensure that the government can provide over-
sight of the groups and can dismantle them once security in the area is estab-
lished.183 In addition, the Rural Defense Corps must register their weapons 
with the Mexican military in order to carry them lawfully.184 The military has 
agreed to give the Rural Defense Corps all necessary means for communica-
tions, operations, and movement to aid the localized self-defense forces in their 
struggle against the Knights Templar.185 Other Latin American countries, such 
as Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, have had negative experiences with such 
legally-recognized groups causing human rights atrocities in in the past.186 
II. ANALYSIS 
Currently, Mexico’s only option for dismantling drug trafficking organiza-
tions is through extradition.187 The country, while it is progressing, still does not 
have an adequate judicial apparatus in place to investigate, prosecute, and dis-
mantle Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and the Sinaloa Cartel.188 The arrest of 
Guzmán demonstrates Mexico’s ability to hunt down and capture one of the 
world’s most powerful and elusive drug trafficker.189 Any misstep, however, in 
either his handling or the prosecution of his case would effectively end the Mex-
ican criminal reform experiment.190 This is not to say that extradition is, or 
should be, Mexico’s long-term solution to its pervasive drug cartel threat.191 
While a kingpin-extradition strategy reduced the extreme cartel-related violence 
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in Colombia, it has since proved damaging to Colombia’s judiciary in the long 
term.192 The extradition of Colombian cartel kingpins left Colombia’s justice 
system relatively impotent and dependent on the United States, resulting in an 
inability of Colombian prosecutors to handle complex drug-trafficking cases.193 
For this reason, Mexico must continue to implement its 2008 criminal justice 
reforms and transition its judiciary to a more transparent and efficient end.194 
A. Mexican Investigative and Prosecutorial Capability 
1. The Status of Mexico’s Criminal Procedure Reforms 
The judicial reforms of 2008 mandated changes covering all thirty-two 
states and the federal justice system, effectively transitioning Mexico’s closed-
door, variegated inquisitorial process based on written arguments, to an accusa-
torial, public trial system with oral advocacy.195 These judicial reforms, howev-
er, initially faced severe criticism due to inadequate resources and a lack of 
requisite implementing legislation.196 On February 5, 2014, however, Mexico’s 
Chamber of Deputies approved a new Código Nacional de Procedimentos 
Penales (National Penal Procedures Code) (CNPP), serving as the necessary 
supplementary legislation to the 2008 reforms.197 The CNPP establishes a uni-
form application of criminal laws across Mexico’s thirty-one states and Federal 
District.198 These reforms will help make Mexico’s judicial sector more trans-
parent and accountable.199 The concept of orality within the accusatorial system 
is “inextricably linked with principles of immediacy, publicity, contradiction” 
and transparency, which are vital when attempting to battle corruption and orga-
nized crime. 200 Moreover, the reforms will bring about a greater demand for 
the professionalization of law enforcement and public prosecutors, which will 
also help address Mexico’s human rights abuses and corrupt judicial sector.201  
Implementation of judicial reform in the Mexican state of Chihuahua has 
taken roughly two-and-a-half years from beginning to end due to its early 
adoption of a criminal procedure code and related reforms.202 Chihuahua, ac-
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cording to a Wilson Center survey, ranks as the most effective Mexican state at 
implementing the reforms and has been recommended as an example of best 
practices to be used by the Unified Code.203 The state of Chihuahua found that 
its goals of efficient, transparent, and equitable justice in dealing with over-
whelming numbers of cases had other benefits such as the faster resolution of 
the city’s minor cases.204 This faster resolution of minor cases, many of which 
took months, even years to cycle through under the old inquisitorial model, 
freed up government resources to attack more serious issues.205 Such resolu-
tion of cases has been possible through the city’s new Center for Alternative 
Justice, which has used mediation to resolve 80 percent of its cases since its 
creation.206 
Article 20 of the amended Mexican constitution, in particular, fosters an ac-
cusatory and oral atmosphere in the new public trial process, including the con-
frontation and cross-examination of witnesses.207 The Mexican federal govern-
ment needs to fully replace the written dossier with public trials for determining 
guilt, in order to take decisions out of the private office and into the courtroom, 
and provide an opportunity to engage in live argument and cross examination.208 
Furthermore, Article 20 of the constitution now requires that judges unfamiliar 
with the case provide an impartial view of the evidence.209 Rather than receiving 
the public prosecutor’s summation of the evidence, the judges will see the evi-
dence presented during proceedings.210 Those trained in the inquisitorial model 
have had a difficult time learning the new procedure quickly.211 The judiciary 
and other relevant actors must be patient and willing to accept such challenges 
inherent in such a transition.212 American courts, prosecutors, and law enforce-
ment officials had similar difficulties when learning how to utilize the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) when it first emerged in 
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1970.213 It was not until decades after its introduction as a legitimate tool to 
combat organized crime that it was adequately and correctly utilized.214 
Mexico’s judicial enforcement capability and corruption woes have been 
promulgated by reports of cartel leaders enjoying plasma televisions, prosti-
tutes, and other amenities while in prison.215 Osiel Cardenas Guillen, known as 
“El Mata Amigos” or “Friend Killer,” continued to run the Gulf Cartel’s multi-
billion dollar enterprise in the northern state of Tamaulipas while confined in 
the Mexican prison in Altiplano.216 Sandra Avila Beltran, the “Queen of the 
Pacific,” received Botox injections while confined to a maximum-security 
prison, while Joaquín Guzmán was smuggled out of Puente Grande prison in a 
laundry truck.217 Cardenas, unlike Guzmán, was captured in Matamoros amid 
gunfire and grenade explosions in 2003, but many experts claim his true de-
scent did not occur until his 2007 extradition to the United States.218 Mexican 
officials at the time claimed that it was not until Cardenas was extradited that 
the Gulf Cartel began to break up.219 
  Public exposure will place judges and attorneys under greater scrutiny.220 
Such transparency will discourage corrupt practices.221 This will serve to incen-
tivize the judiciary to accept their new role and to foster a more acceptable 
standard for their courtrooms.222 Judges will now have a stake in the system, 
motivated by their new role as conciliators of the public good, rather than as 
anonymous civil servants operating outside of community inquiry.223 Chihuahua, 
for example, has set a significant precedent by recording proceedings in an effort 
to cultivate oversight, dissuade corruption, and encourage professionalism.224 
The ability of victims to challenge any public prosecutor who decides not to 
prosecute, fails to present certain evidence, or drops a criminal proceeding will 
also depress the current perversion of the criminal justice system. 225 Less than 
25 percent of crimes in Mexico are reported, and of those reported, few are ever 
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probed and prosecuted.226 This suggests that only small proportions of the coun-
try’s crimes are genuinely addressed.227 Public attendance and the recording of 
criminal proceedings, in conjunction with a victim’s ability to challenge a prose-
cutor’s discretion, provide new means of accountability that will foster public 
trust in the system, which is essential if Mexico hopes to establish a functioning 
and effective criminal justice system.228 
A successful prosecution of a high-profile cartel leader within Mexico, 
such as Guzmán, would garner much media attention, providing an opportuni-
ty for Mexican citizens to learn not only about the criminal justice transfor-
mation, but also about the benefits of foreign concepts like plea-bargaining.229 
Failure to convey the benefits of the new system to the Mexican people may 
undermine public buy-in.230 Recent survey data gathered from the Mexican 
citizenry reveals the need for more public awareness about why the reforms 
were enacted and what positive changes they are designed to produce.231 The 
data suggests that the public is less concerned about safeguarding the rights of 
the accused and more interested in punishing the guilty.232 Seventy-four per-
cent of the polling public also indicated that they have little to no faith in the 
criminal justice system, exemplifying the uphill battle that Mexico fac-
es.233Eighty-nine percent of the surveyed population in fact knew nothing of 
the 2008 judicial reforms; but when told about some key elements of the re-
forms, such as oral trials, eighty percent expressed optimism and a renewed 
hope in the judicial system.234 
Additionally, continued U.S. assistance and funding provided for judicial 
reform through the Mérida Initiative is conditioned upon the Mexican govern-
ment’s prioritization of its criminal justice reforms.235 A Mexican commitment 
to successfully prosecuting Guzmán, by extradition to the United States, would 
demonstrate the necessary political will and dedication to reform implementa-
tion that the United States requires for their continued support of the Mérida 
Initiative.236 U.S. technical assistance and training is vital to expediting the 
reform process.237 
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2. Mexico’s Pseudo-RICO Federal Organized Crime Act 
Mexico’s federal organized crime statute, Ley Federal Contra la De-
lincuencia Organizada (LFCDO), in conjunction with the 2008 reforms, now 
allows Mexican law enforcement agencies to fashion new methods of collabora-
tion with cross-border U.S. agents.238 Wire-tapping and alternative exits, such as 
plea-bargaining and reparative agreements, have also been introduced, which 
allow prosecutors more instruments for acquiring confessions and valuable in-
formants.239 Informants and wiretaps played a large role in the capture of 
Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.240 A number of arrests of Sinaloa Cartel members 
prior to Guzmán’s arrest provided useful informants and phones from which to 
gather intelligence.241 Five wiretaps yielded valuable intelligence about Guz-
mán—four by the DEA and one by U.S. Customs and Enforcement.242 
Given its inexperience in these investigative and prosecutorial techniques, 
Mexico does not have the same ethos as the United States in regards to devastat-
ing enforcement of drug trafficking and organized crime laws.243 Mexico’s cur-
rent inexperience in prosecutorial techniques, like plea-bargaining and the direc-
tion of complex trafficking investigations, will likely cause Mexico to flounder 
this opportunity not only to bring Guzmán to justice, but also to learn vital in-
formation about the Sinaloa Cartel.244 Moreover, Mexico’s reformed pseudo-
RICO legislation, the LFCDO, has blatant shortcomings, particularly when uti-
lized against such high-profile leaders.245 Mexico’s LFCDO does not include the 
predicate crimes of murder or extortion, and thus does not enable prosecutors to 
hold Guzmán liable for either crime.246 Despite these limitations, Mexico is on 
the right track to becoming a self-sustaining judicial system that is free of cor-
ruption.247 Mexico’s new authorization to use such tactics will enable it to con-
tribute more in its cooperation with the United States and will provide it with the 
ability to conduct its own comprehensive investigations in the future.248 
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B. Mexico Is Not Colombia: Mischaracterizing the Threat 
Modern comparisons between Mexico and Colombia fail to highlight key 
differences between the two countries that are crucial to analyzing current 
methods of combating DTOs in Mexico.249 Colombia’s problems resulted from 
power vacuums that were accelerated by an upsurge of non-state actors, in-
cluding paramilitary and guerilla forces, which eventually led to the establish-
ment  of the Medellín Cartel’s power.250 It was the presence of these politically 
motivated guerilla forces, rather than traditional organized crime, that necessi-
tated focus by the Colombian government’s militarized “counter-insurgency” 
efforts.251 Unlike in Mexico, Colombia’s DTOs were enmeshed in politically 
motivated battlegrounds between non-state actors where guerillas and paramil-
itaries were the primary contributors to the violence.252 Murders in Mexico, on 
the other hand, are primarily carried out by DTOs to convey messages to ad-
versaries, law enforcement, and the citizenry, and are devoid of any political 
agenda.253 The ultimate goal for DTOs is money, not sovereignty.254 
Dismantling profit-motivated DTOs is not the same as combating politi-
cally motivated guerilla insurgencies.255 Breaking up an insurgent group may 
lower morale and encourage desertion or surrender.256 Fracturing a DTO cuts 
standards of entry for fresh criminal organizations seeking to broaden their 
market influence, thus providing opportunities for inferior leaders to rise to the 
top of the organization.257 Both of these outcomes result in violence and blood-
shed, whether through infighting or externalized territorial seizures.258 The 
most common metaphor used to describe such kingpin removal policies is the 
hydra: cut off one head and another grows right back.259 Moreover, Colombia, 
in conjunction with the United States, placed military and special forces troops 
on the ground to address a drug problem largely based on production, which 
could be combatted through eradication efforts.260 Mexico, on the other hand, 
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is a problem of dismantling distribution networks, which does not lend itself as 
cleanly to a Colombia-style military role. 261 Mexico must instead attack these 
corporate DTOs with traditional law enforcement investigative techniques and 
targeted legislation such as its own Federal Organized Crime Act.262 
Mexico is not facing an insurgency.263 Characterizing the Mexican drug 
trafficking problem with such doom-laden depictions serves to misdiagnose 
the underlying issues and leads to derisory and inapposite strategy.264 Felipe 
Calderón failed to realize the differences between Colombia and Mexico, and 
thus incorrectly, albeit not entirely negligently, used the Colombian example as 
justification for his militarized kingpin approach in his own country.265 Calde-
rón’s extradition and kingpin strategy largely failed because he did not satisfac-
torily evolve other necessary governmental functions in tandem, including a pro-
fessionalized federal police, criminal procedure reform, and the institution of 
legal weapons to combat organized crime.266 
Equally significant, high-profile drug leaders comparable to Pablo Escobar 
have avoided his example.267 High profile drug traffickers, like Escobar in Co-
lombia, were more likely to be targeted by the state due to their public extrava-
gance.268 Mexican cartel leaders, including Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, 
learned a valuable lesson from Escobar’s individual decadence and megaloma-
nia, preferring to focus on their business acumen.269 For example, Guzmán’s 
actions and leadership of the Sinaloa Cartel was not evident to law enforcement 
for years.270 Mexican DTOs now solely rely “on corruption as good business, 
delegation over micromanagement, and the franchising of their operations.”271 
As a result, Mexican cartels no longer profit solely from drugs, but now benefit 
from other associated activities such as kidnapping, extortion, and human traf-
ficking as part of their profit base.272 
Although the extradition of Mexican cartel leaders to U.S. courts may re-
sult in immediate headlines, it is unsustainable in the long run due to the splin-
tering of these leaderless organizations into more violent offshoots and the in-
competence of the Mexican government in handling large, complex drug traf-
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ficking cases.273 The Colombian government instituted this same kingpin-
extradition approach against the Medellín and Cali cartels of the 1980s and 
1990s, whose leaders preferred graves to extradition.274 Pablo Escobar and 
groups such as the Extraditables amassed to better combat extradition.275 This is 
because the U.S. federal court system is more intimidating to cartel leaders, 
due to the essential severance from their country and placement in a system not 
as amenable to bribery or special treatment.276 The Colombian judiciary, how-
ever, still does not have the prosecutorial competence to investigate and try 
complex drug trafficking cases because of this traditional custom of extraditing 
its cartel leaders to the United States.277 This is evidenced by the current U.S. 
practice of extraditing not only drug kingpins, but also periphery players in Co-
lombian trafficking circuit as well.278 Such a practice of extradition is not only 
an expensive strategy for the United States, but an untenable practice that has 
precluded Colombia, and will, if continued in the long term, prevent Mexico, 
from training its own attorneys and judicial officers on to how prosecute com-
plex drug trafficking cases.279 Although Mexico must extradite leaders such as 
Guzmán in the present, it must stay committed to its reforms in order to con-
struct a self-sustaining judiciary for the future.280 
CONCLUSION 
Intense cooperation with the United States is essential as Mexico continues 
to transition its criminal justice system. Unfortunately, Mexico is still in an em-
bryonic stage of its criminal justice reform initiative, and therefore does not 
have adequate tools in place to investigate, try, convict, and detain a high-
profile cartel leader such as Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. A premature attempt 
to do so without sufficient training in its transitioning criminal justice system 
will likely result in inadequacies and a substandard, if not failed, prosecution. 
Such a result would deter an already fragile and skeptical citizenry from trust-
ing the new reforms. For this reason, Mexico should extradite Joaquín “El 
Chapo” Guzmán and other recently captured cartel leaders to the United States 
to permit competent extraction of cartel intelligence and immediate, substantial 
prosecutions. 
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Mexico must, however, continue to commit to implementation of its re-
forms so as to acquire the capability of confronting the many mid- to high-level 
cartel capos in its own country in the future. Mexico is not facing a politically 
charged insurgency, but rather a profit-driven drug trafficking organization. With 
this in mind, Mexico must desist its militarized confrontations, which serve to 
propagate violence, and instead stay committed to strengthening its law en-
forcement investigatory ability alongside its criminal justice reforms. 
 Long-term Mexican success against its drug trafficking threat and contin-
ued maintenance of its sovereignty necessitates an eventual end to sole depend-
ence on the United States for investigation, extradition, and conviction. Such a 
calculated approach will provide Mexico the investigatory and prosecutorial 
capability, as well as the requisite political capital, to serve as a more potent 
partner alongside the United States and other countries against drug trafficking 
organizations in the Western hemisphere. Until then, Mexico must be patient, 
and, although it may sting its pride, extradite Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán to the 
United States as it continues to pursue its criminal justice reform. 
